{"id":3534,"date":"2024-05-13T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-05-13T14:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.darkreading.com\/cyberattacks-data-breaches\/why-tokens-are-like-gold-for-opportunistic-threat-actors"},"modified":"2024-05-13T09:00:00","modified_gmt":"2024-05-13T14:00:00","slug":"why-tokens-are-like-gold-for-opportunistic-threat-actors","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ddi.mohflo.net\/index.php\/2024\/05\/13\/why-tokens-are-like-gold-for-opportunistic-threat-actors\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Tokens Are Like Gold for Opportunistic Threat Actors"},"content":{"rendered":"
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COMMENTARY<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Authentication tokens aren’t actual physical tokens, of course. But when these digital identifiers aren’t expired regularly or pinned for use by a specific device only, they may as well be made of gold in the hands of threat actors.<\/span><\/p>\n

Authentication tokens (or “session tokens” as they are commonly called) are an important part of cybersecurity. They encapsulate login authorization data to enable app validations and secure, authenticated logins to networks, software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications, cloud computing, and identity provider (IdP) systems or single sign-on (SSO) for ubiquitous corporate system access. Which means that anyone with a token has a gold key to corporate systems \u2014 without requiring a multifactor authentication (MFA) challenge.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Risks of Employee Convenience<\/h2>\n

A token’s lifetime is often leveraged to provide a tradeoff between security and employee convenience, enabling users to authenticate once to maintain enduring access to applications for a specified time. However, threat actors are increasingly obtaining these tokens through adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks, where the attacker is positioned either in the middle between the user and legitimate applications to steal credentials or tokens, and pass-the-cookie attacks, which nab session cookies stored on browsers. <\/span><\/p>\n

Personal devices also have browser caches but do not have to pass the security rigor of corporate systems. They are more easily compromised by threat actors who can capture tokens directly from poorly secured personal devices. Yet personal devices are often allowed access to corporate SaaS applications, posing threats to corporate systems.<\/span><\/p>\n

Once a threat actor has a token, they also have whatever rights and authorizations are imbued to the user. If they have captured an IdP token, they can access all corporate applications’ SSO capabilities integrated with the IdP \u2014 without an MFA challenge. If it is an admin-level credential with associated privileges, they can potentially wage a world of devastation against systems, data, and backups. The longer the token is active, the more they can access, steal, and damage. Further, they can then create new accounts that no longer require the use of the token for ongoing network access.<\/span><\/p>\n

While expiring session tokens more frequently will not stop these sorts of attacks, it will greatly minimize the risk footprint by shortening the window of opportunity for a token to function. Unfortunately, we often see that tokens are not being expired at regular intervals, and some breach reporting also suggests that default token expirations are being deliberately extended.<\/span><\/p>\n

Token Attacks in the Spotlight<\/h2>\n

Last year, several breach cases involving captured authentication tokens appeared in the news. Two cases involved compromised IdP tokens. <\/span>According to Okta<\/a><\/span>, threat actors were in their systems from Sept. 28 to Oct. 17 due to a compromise of a personal Gmail account. A saved password in the Gmail account was synchronized in the Chrome browser, enabling access to a service account, likely without MFA enforcement. Once in the service account, threat actors were able to capture other customer session tokens from HAR files stored in ServiceNow. The breach ultimately affected all <\/span>Okta customer support users<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Notably, on Nov. 23, 2023, <\/span>Cloudflare detected<\/a><\/span> a threat actor targeting its systems using session tokens from the Okta breach. This indicates that these session tokens <\/span>were not expired<\/span><\/span> a full 30 to 60 days following the Okta breach \u2014 not as a routine course of business, and not in reaction to the breach itself.<\/span><\/p>\n

In September 2023, <\/span>Microsoft also made news<\/a><\/span> by disclosing that threat actors had obtained a consumer signing key from a Windows crash dump. They then used it to compromise Exchange and Active Directory accounts by exploiting an unknown bug that allowed enterprise systems to accept session tokens signed with the consumer signing key. This led to the theft of 60,000 US State Department emails. It is possible this breach would not have been as impactful if tokens had been more aggressively expired (or pinned).<\/span><\/p>\n

What Should Companies Be Doing?<\/h2>\n

The key lesson for organizations is that tokens present risk \u2014 but there are ways to minimize these risks and execute a more aggressive token management program:<\/span><\/p>\n

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