{"id":4639,"date":"2024-08-06T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-08-06T13:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.darkreading.com\/ics-ot-security\/rockwell-plc-security-bypass-threatens-manufacturing-processes"},"modified":"2024-08-06T08:00:00","modified_gmt":"2024-08-06T13:00:00","slug":"rockwell-plc-security-bypass-threatens-manufacturing-processes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ddi.mohflo.net\/index.php\/2024\/08\/06\/rockwell-plc-security-bypass-threatens-manufacturing-processes\/","title":{"rendered":"Rockwell PLC Security Bypass Threatens Manufacturing Processes"},"content":{"rendered":"
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A security bypass vulnerability in Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 1756 devices could open critical infrastructure to cyberattacks on the operational technology (OT) that controls physical processes.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Claroty’s Team82, the bug (CVE-2024-6242, CVSS 8.4), could allow a remote attacker with network access to the device to send elevated commands to the CPU of a <\/span>programmable logic controller<\/a><\/span> (PLC), from an untrusted chassis card.<\/span><\/p>\n

“Our technique allowed us to bypass the trusted slot feature implemented by Rockwell that enforces security policies and allows the controller to deny communication via untrusted paths on the local chassis,” Claroty researcher Sharon Brizinov explained in a blog posting on the bug.<\/span><\/p>\n

The result? Successful attackers can download new logic for controlling a PLC’s behavior, and send other elevated commands that would interfere with the <\/span>physical operations of a manufacturing site<\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rockwell has issued a fix, and users are urged to apply it immediately; and the <\/span>Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has published mitigation advice<\/a><\/span>, noting that exploitation is a low-complexity endeavor.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Rockwell, ControlLogix, GuardLogix, and 1756 ControlLogix I\/O Modules, widely deployed in industrial manufacturing environments, are affected by the vulnerability.<\/span><\/p>\n

Manipulating the Trusted Slot Mechanism<\/h2>\n

The 1756 chassis is a modular enclosure that houses various cards within physical slots that are responsible for communicating with sensors, actuators, and other OT equipment; they also provide the physical and electrical connections to allow those components to interoperate and talk to each other. All of the communication and connections are carried out via a shared circuit board known as the backplane, using the common industrial protocol, or CIP.<\/span><\/p>\n

“A 1756 PLC in a production line might be connected to multiple sources via different network cards, for example, the human-machine interface (HMI) panel, engineering workstation, and other devices,” Brizinov explained. “To ensure that only specific individual devices are performing elevated operations on the PLC such as download logic, a security mechanism was introduced called trusted slot.”<\/span><\/p>\n

The trusted-slot feature ensures that only authorized slots can communicate with each other, protecting against potential tampering. It does this by requiring slots to essentially authenticate to the PLC.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, Claroty found a way around that.<\/span><\/p>\n

“Since all slots are connected via the backplane, and CIP supports path (routing), we could generate a CIP packet that will be routed through a trusted card before it reaches the CPU,” according to <\/span>the blog post<\/a><\/span>. “Basically, the method involved ‘jumping’ between local backplane slots\u2026This technique allowed us to traverse the security boundary that was meant to protect the CPU from untrusted cards.”<\/span><\/p>\n

To prevent the exposure of critical control systems to unauthorized access over the CIP protocol, site security administrators should apply Rockwell’s patches immediately:<\/span><\/p>\n

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