{"id":6926,"date":"2025-01-15T10:18:50","date_gmt":"2025-01-15T16:18:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.darkreading.com\/endpoint-security\/extension-poisoning-campaign-gaps-browser-security"},"modified":"2025-01-15T10:18:50","modified_gmt":"2025-01-15T16:18:50","slug":"extension-poisoning-campaign-highlights-gaps-in-browser-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ddi.mohflo.net\/index.php\/2025\/01\/15\/extension-poisoning-campaign-highlights-gaps-in-browser-security\/","title":{"rendered":"Extension Poisoning Campaign Highlights Gaps in Browser Security"},"content":{"rendered":"
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A Christmas Eve phishing attack resulted in an unknown party taking over a Cyberhaven employee’s Google Chrome Web Store account and <\/span>publishing a malicious version of Cyberhaven’s Chrome extension<\/a><\/span>. While the problematic extension was removed within an hour of its discovery, the malicious activity highlights gaps in browser security that exist at most organizations and the necessity of getting a handle on the problem now, as extension poisoning is expected to be a persistent issue.<\/span><\/p>\n

Further research into the incident<\/a><\/span> suggests that this attack was likely part of two separate, but potentially related, campaigns to target multiple extension developers to distribute malicious extensions, experts say. The campaigns may have begun as early as April 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n

“Currently we know about two different campaigns that have been targeting different objectives,” says Amit Assaraf, CEO of Extension Total, a third-party extension security platform provider. Extension Total researchers have <\/span>uncovered<\/a><\/span> several <\/span>malicious extensions<\/a><\/span> over the past several weeks and have been looking at how they relate to each other.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Tale of Two Campaigns<\/h2>\n

One campaign created extensions that steal cookies, session tokens, and possibly passwords, and targeted <\/span>Facebook <\/a><\/span>and OpenAI accounts, Assaraf says. The campaign relied on phishing to target extension developers and a malicious OAUTH application to take over Google Chrome Web Store accounts. Cyberhaven was one of the victims of this campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

There is some disagreement among experts over when the first malicious extension associated with this campaign appeared. Assaraf points to the Chrome extension “<\/span>GPT 4 Summary with OpenAI<\/span><\/span>,” which was added to the Google Chrome Web Store in August. John Tuckner, founder of browser-extension management service Secure Annex, believes the “<\/span>AI Assistant \u2013 ChatGPT and Gemini for Chrome<\/span><\/span>” extension, which was uploaded to the Chrome Web Store in May, was the first extension used by this campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

“As far as I can tell, that is the first example of this type of code being used, but some of the related domain registrations go back to around Sept. 25, 2023, so this could have been planned for a while,” Tuckner says.<\/span><\/p>\n

Both extensions are no longer on the Chrome Web Store.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regardless of when this campaign began, the impact has been widespread. Researchers have found 22 extensions related to it so far, affecting 1.46 million users, Assaraf says. Some of these have been removed completely from the Chrome Web Store, and others have been updated to a “safe” version.<\/span><\/p>\n

The second campaign is aimed at tracking user activity, telemetry, and sites visited, “probably with intention to sell this data,” Assaraf says. Its earliest appearance was in April 2023, and researchers have identified 15 extensions thus far as belonging to this campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Google spokesperson says the company has shut down malicious Chrome Web Store accounts identified as part of this investigation and continues to investigate reports from Extension Total regarding extensions still available in the store.<\/span><\/p>\n

It’s unclear at this time whether one attacker is behind both campaigns, though there is evidence \u2014 shared JavaScript payloads injected into unauthorized updates between August 2024 and December 2024 \u2014 suggesting “a synchronized campaign,” says Bugcrowd founder Casey John Ellis.<\/span><\/p>\n

“This also suggests centralized control over the hijacked developer accounts and a common threat actor,” he says.<\/span><\/p>\n

At this point, both campaigns appear to be contained; no additional extensions have been discovered, according to Assaraf.<\/span><\/p>\n

Extensions as Low-Hanging Fruit for Attackers<\/h2>\n

Cyberhaven’s internal security team was able to respond to the breach quickly, which helped expose the breadth of the extension poisoning. Many of the affected extensions are hobbyist projects, which means they likely do not have the tools or security support to be regularly monitoring for malware.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therein lies the dilemma for detecting malicious <\/span>Chrome extensions<\/a><\/span> in the wild, experts say. It also explains why ensuring that extensions used within a corporate browser are safe is such a tricky scenario for organizations to navigate. While some are managed by companies with dedicated teams to ensure the extensions remain clean, many are maintained by private individuals and, thus, don’t have this kind of oversight.<\/span><\/p>\n

That <\/span>complicates security within a corporate environment<\/a><\/span> because browsers, like Chrome, grant extensions broad permissions, including access to sensitive user data, cookies, and even the ability to capture credentials and sessions, according to Matt Johansen, security researcher at Vulnerable U.<\/span><\/p>\n

“Extensions still operate with a significant degree of trust, and once compromised, they can access everything a user can,” Johansen says. “They also have less scrutiny to install than traditional desktop software, even in enterprises.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Because of their ability to compromise so many users and have access to so much information by poisoning a browser extension, it’s a no-brainer for attackers.<\/span><\/p>\n

“Controlling an extension gives an adversary a powerful vantage point for all browser activities,” concurs Lionel Litty, chief security architect at Menlo Security.<\/span><\/p>\n

Indeed, poisoning a Chrome extension is “actually a very convenient way for attackers to spread malicious code,” Assaraf adds. “You only need to fool one person, one developer, and you get access to hundreds of thousands of machines,” he says.<\/span><\/p>\n

People often forget they’ve installed browser extensions, yet they continue to run in the background and update automatically, giving attackers wide access to sensitive data, he adds.<\/span><\/p>\n

Closing the Browser Security Gap<\/h2>\n

Given their reach, why, then, are browsers and their extensions given such little thought when it comes to an organization’s security posture? It could merely be that their security teams are so overwhelmed with responsibilities that browsers are the least of their worries \u2014 though that could now change, notes Secure Annex’s Tuckner.<\/span><\/p>\n

Organizations can take specific steps now to shore up the security of extensions running in corporate browsers, he says. Teams should start with collecting a real-time inventory of the browsers in the organization and which extensions are installed on them. This step should be followed by enrolling browsers in some kind of centralized management to set up an <\/span>allowlist<\/span><\/span> of known extensions, keeping only those that “drive core business value” and adding future ones on a case-by-case basis, Tuckner adds. The inventory will help security teams understand the scope of an incident when something happens.<\/span><\/p>\n

“Few teams choose to or are able to prioritize browser security on top of everything else that they have to deal with,” he says. “Many see browser security as a lower-risk item, but I believe that is quickly changing with incidents like this.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Source<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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